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The present study (n = 335) attempted to conceptually replicate Hunt, Kim, Borgida, and 
Chaiken (2010) with a high-powered design to investigate whether values and self-interest 
differentially impact attitudes depending on psychological distance. Participants were assigned to 
complete a task that made self- or other-focused values more accessible, then indicated their 
attitudes about a student fee increase at a university to fund scholarships the participants would 
not be eligible to receive (thus going against their own financial self-interest for the well being of 
someone else). The memo describing the fee increase was manipulated such that the increase 
would be occurring at either the socially proximal University of Arkansas (where the study was 
conducted), or socially distal University of Maine. Measures of financial strain we used as 
measures of self-interest, and an additional measure of values was collected prior to the values 
manipulation. Results showed that values (regardless of being measured or manipulated) had no 
significant effect on attitudes, but self-interest (when operationalized as objective financial 
strain) and construal did. As participants’ financial strain (i.e., self-interest) went up, support for 
the fee increase went down; and support for the fee increase was greater in the socially distal 
condition. Hunt and colleagues’ model did not replicate with the present data, as no interactions 
between these three variables were found.  
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In 1960, the authors of The American Voter held that “people presented with certain 
policy alternatives can do a reasonable job of selecting responses that appear to further their self-
interest” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, p. 208). However, by the time The 
American Voter Revisited was published, nearly 50 years later, there had been a distinct shift 
such that the authors instead concluded, “The current scholarly consensus holds that self-interest 
is not [emphasis added] a major determinant of issue attitudes” (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, p. 197). 
Over these intermediate years, scholars, political strategists, and pundits alike have continued ask 
the questions of whether people vote against their material self-interest; and if so, why, and to 
what extent (e.g., Carville, 2016; Feldman, 1984; Frank, 2004; Haidt; 2012; Lee, 2016; Sears & 
Funk, 1990, 1991)?  
Some scholars have argued that self-interest, as compared to symbolic attitudes and 
beliefs (e.g., liberal or conservative ideology, values, party identification, racial prejudice, 
Protestant work ethic), has very little deterministic effect on policy attitudes or voting behavior 
(the “symbolic attitudes perspective;” e.g., Sears & Funk, 1991; Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, 
1979). Other scholars have argued that perhaps the diminishing role of self-interest in the 
literature could be due to inadequate indicators of self-interest (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1990), or 
overly narrow definitions of “self-interest” (e.g., typically only considering the short-term, 
immediate, self-interest) and unnecessarily distinguishing between self- and group-interest, 
“defining out the possibility of self-interest being a major determinant of political views” 
(Weeden & Kurzban, 2017). Indeed, Weeden and Kurzban concluded self-interest variables 
typically have more secure claims to being causal determinants of individuals’ attitudes than the 
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individuals’ ideology, party, and values. But the values (symbolic attitudes) vs. self-interest 
debate is far from settled. 
Hunt, Kim, Borgida, and Chaiken (2010) argued that both values and self-interest play a 
role in social and political attitudes, but it is contextual, specifically depending on psychological 
distance. These authors considered the self-interest vs. values debate through the lens of 
Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007) and found that self-interest 
carried more predictive power of attitudes towards a proposed policy change (which would 
increase financial strain on participants) when it was in the (“psychologically proximal”) near 
future; but, when the same policy change was in the (“psychologically distal”) distant future, 
abstract values were more predictive of attitudes towards the policy change. The present study 
conceptually replicated this study by Hunt et al. (2010), with a high-powered design towards 
generalizing the conceptual connections between values, self-interest, and psychological distance 
(i.e., CLT). 
Values 
It has now been a century since social attitudes were first proposed as the central-most 
construct in social psychology (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918). For the many decades that followed, 
“attitudes” was indeed the modal focus term within the theoretical and experiential social 
psychology literature (Allport, 1935, p. 789). Some 50 years later, however, Rokeach (1968) 
began making his arguments for why values, not attitudes, are deserving of occupying this 
central role in research. Among his arguments were: due to having strong motivational, cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral components, values are more dynamic concepts than attitudes; that 
values are a more economical tool for explaining similarities and differences among individuals 
and groups given the parsimony offered by individuals possessing far fewer values than 
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attitudes; and given that attitudes was primarily a concern of psychology and sociology, whereas 
values were a multi-disciplinary concern (e.g., philosophy, education, political science, 
economics, theology), values are relatively ubiquitous and the study thereof may facilitate 
greater interdisciplinary research and integration. One additional argument, most related to the 
present research, was that Rokeach claimed values and attitudes are each widely assumed to be 
determinants of behavior, but values are also a determinant of attitudes.  
Values defined. At this point, a reader may be wondering, “but what is a ‘value’ vs. an 
‘attitude’?” This same question has been on the minds of social psychologists for many years. 
Indeed, for some time there has been a “semantic-conceptual quagmire” in the literature vis-à-vis 
the conceptual and definitional boundaries between beliefs, attitudes, and values; often these 
terms are used interchangeably, occasionally even within the same article (Levie, 1970). 
Rokeach (1968) offered his definitions for distinguishing amongst these interrelated constructs. 
According to Rokeach, an attitude is, “a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an 
object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner” (p. 112), and a 
belief is, “any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or 
does, capable of being preceded by the phrase ‘I believe that…’” (p. 113). A value, on the other 
hand, he defined as a special type of belief; specifically one that is “centrally located within 
one’s total belief system about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of 
existence worth or not worth attaining” (p. 124). He later more clearly defined values as 
“enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or 
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct end state of existence” (Rokeach, 
1973, p. 5). This definition of values was compatible with those preceding Rokeach’s (1968; 
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1973) work (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Smith, 1963), and has remained largely consistent with 
those that followed (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).  
Values structure. Over the years since Rokeach (1968), values research has considered 
not only the relationships between values and behaviors or attitudes, but also the relationships 
between the values themselves, or, the structure of values systems. Rokeach (1973) posited that 
rather than every person having different values, there are common or comprehensive “sets” of 
values for all humans, and people merely differ in the order in which they rank the importance of 
each value within the set. He proposed a list of 18 terminal values that are desirable end states 
(e.g., equality, freedom, a world of beauty) and 18 instrumental values that are means to 
accomplish terminal values (e.g., being honest, helpful, obedient). Given this distinction, 
Rokeach’s concept of “values systems” entailed two functionally and cognitively connected, yet 
distinct rank-ordered structures of terminal and instrumental values.  
Schwartz & Bilsky (1987) agreed that values are (1) beliefs (2) that pertain to desirable 
end states or modes of conduct, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation 
of behavior, people, and events, and (5) vary by importance relative to other values to form a 
system of values priorities (i.e., a “values system”). However, a key distinction between the 
conceptualization of values posited by these authors and that of Rokeach (1973), was that 
Rokeach conceptualized a hierarchical, rank-ordered structure of values (rather, two sets of rank-
ordered values), but Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; refined by Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 
2012) posited a more parsimonious single set of values (“motivational domains”), and a 
fundamentally different structure of the values. Specifically, these authors’ values structure was 
defined as a circular motivational continuum (see Figure 1), wherein adjacent values are 
compatible with each other (e.g., tradition and conformity) while values opposite one another 
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conflict with each other (at least to some extent; e.g., self-direction and conformity), and values 
dimensionally orthogonal to one-another are more or less unrelated (e.g., achievement and self-
direction of thought or action). This congruence and conflict among values defines the “structure” 
of values in the Schwartz framework.  
 
 Though Schwartz’s theory of values originally had 10 motivationally distinct values 
(Schwartz, 1992), this was refined to 19 distinct values some years later (Schwartz et al., 2012; 
for overview, see Schwartz, 2012). As shown in Figure 1 (see the outer two circles), the order of 
Figure 1. Schwartz’s circular motivational continuum of 19 values. Adapted 
from “Refining the Theory of Basic Individual Values,” by S. H. Schwartz, 
2012, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(4), 669. Copyright 
2012 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. 
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the values (i.e., the theoretical relationships of compatibility and conflict between values) is 
determined by two dimensions: (1) values that focus on personal (e.g., achievement) or social 
(e.g., tradition) outcomes; and (2) whether pursuit of the value serves self-protection or anxiety 
avoidance (e.g., societal security, power over resources) or serves growth or being anxiety free 
(e.g., hedonism, self-direction of thoughts). The inwardly third (white, four-part) circle 
represents the “higher order” values. Here, “conservation” (values that emphasize self-restriction, 
order, and avoiding change) opposes “openness to change” (values that emphasize readiness for 
new ideas, actions, and experiences), and “self-enhancement” (values that emphasize pursuing 
one’s own interests) opposes “self-transcendence” (values that emphasize transcending one’s 
own interests for the sake of others; Schwartz et al., 2012). 
Values, attitudes, and behavior. Because value relations are motivational (e.g., Pakizeh, 
Gebauer, & Maio, 2007; Schwartz, 2017; Rokeach, 1973), values are widely regarded as playing 
a determining role in attitudes and behavior (e.g., Ball-Rokeach & Lodges, 1996; Kluckhohn, 
1951; Smith, 1963; Schwartz et al. 2017; Williams, 1968; cf. Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; 
McClelland, 1985). This idea has garnered widespread empirical support over the years. For 
instance, values have been linked with attitudes towards equality (e.g., Schwartz, Caprara, & 
Vecchione, 2010; Blankenship, Wegener, & Murray, 2010) social welfare programs (Feldman & 
Steenbergen, 2001), racial questions (Kinder & Sanders, 1996), gay rights and abortion (e.g., 
Brewer, 2003; Weisberg, 2005).  
Values accessibility. Though values have been shown to influence behavior and attitudes, 
not all values are equal to every individual at all times. Social cognition research as often shown 
that individuals’ judgments, attitudes, and behaviors are more likely to be influenced by 
knowledge structures that are highly accessible in memory, as opposed to those that are not (for 
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review, see Higgins, 1996). It follows then, that when values (which are knowledge structures; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) are made accessible, these values should exert more influence on 
individuals. Thus, a manipulation that temporarily increases the accessibility of specific values 
would be expected to also increase attitudes, behaviors, and/or judgments that are congruent with 
those specific values. Indeed, this effect of values accessibility manipulations (using diverse 
methodology has been established in the research literature (e.g., Sagiv, Sverdlik, & Schwartz, 
2011; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001; Verplanken & Holland, 2002, Assor, 1999; Biernat, 
Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Hertel & Kerr, 2001).  
For example, Gerbasi and Prentice (2013) manipulated the accessibility of self- vs. other-
focused values by having participants respond to 17 items from Schwartz’s (1992) Short Value 
Survey (SVS). Specifically, participants in the “self-focused condition” responded to 17 SVS 
items that fall under Schwartz’s self (personal) focused values (e.g., achievement), and 
participants in the “other-focused condition” responded to 17 SVS items under Schwartz’s other 
(social) focused values (e.g., tradition). Results showed significant increases in measures of self-
interest or other-interest in the self- and other-focused conditions, respectively (for similar values 
manipulation see Katz & Hass, 1988).  
In short, values have been shown to influence behaviors and attitudes, at least to the 
extent the values are accessible; and experimental manipulations have been shown to increase 
the accessibility of values.  
Construal Level Theory 
Individuals understand the world around them by forming mental representations of the 
objects and events they encounter (Bruner, 1957). CLT is a theory which offers insight into how 
these mental representations are formed (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010; Trope, 2012; Trope, 
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Liberman, & Stephan, 2007; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Specifically, CLT relates to 
the extent with which we process information about objects or events abstractly or concretely, 
depending on the “psychological distance” associated with those objects or events. This distance 
comes in many dimensions such as temporal distance, spatial distance, social distance (high vs. 
low familiarity with social objects), or factual/reality distance (e.g., hypotheticality, probability; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010). Broadly stated, information about an object or event that is 
construed distally will be processed in a more abstract, simple, global, and de-contextualized 
manner, whereas information about an event or object that is proximally construed (i.e., closer) 
will be processed in a concrete, complex, and situated, often context-specific manner (e.g., 
Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & Alexopoulos, 2012; Wong & Wyer Jr., 2016; Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
CLT, attitudes, and behavior. This relationship between psychological distance and 
abstract (vs. concrete) processing has implications in many aspects of cognitive, motivational, 
social, and behavioral tendencies. For instance, individuals’ evaluations of an action are not only 
a function of the (abstract) desirability of that action, but also the (concrete) feasibility of 
engaging in it (Kim, Park, Wyer Jr., 2009). Kim and colleagues (2009) found that whether 
participants placed more weight in desirable features of an apartment (e.g., furnishings and 
internet access provided), or feasibility features of an apartment (e.g., low moving costs, flexible 
move-in date) depended on whether the participant was considering the apartment in the context 
of moving in the next day (temporally proximal), or six months later (temporally distal). In this 
case, the participants who were considering a proximal move made their decisions based on the 
concrete feasibility features, whereas the participants considering a distal move made their 
decisions based on the abstract desirability features of the apartment.  
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Similarly, other researchers have found participants’ attraction to an upcoming guest 
lecture— which was also manipulated along dimensions of desirability (interesting vs. 
uninteresting) and feasibility (convenient vs. inconvenient)— depended on whether the lecture 
was in the near or distant future (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Here, the attractiveness of the 
interesting but inconvenient lecture increased with temporal distance, while the attractiveness of 
the uninteresting but convenient lecture increased with temporal proximity (see also Liviatan, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007). Moreover, when primed with a 
distant-future construal, participants categorized a set of items into a few broad categories, 
whereas those primed with a near-future construal categorized the same set of items into a large 
number of small groups (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). Construal has even been found 
to have a relationship with preferring a gamble that has high-payoff but low probability for 
success (for high-level construal, and vice versa for low-level construal; Sagristano, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2002). 
Many dimensions as one construct. It seems clear then, from an empirical standpoint, 
that individuals’ attitudes, judgments, and anticipated behaviors vary as a function of construal 
level. But importantly, many years of empirical research have shown a consistently strong 
relationship between these seemingly different dimensions of distance (e.g., temporal, social), 
both within and between individuals, such that many scholars accept the assertion that the 
different dimensions combine onto one unitary distance construct, and are conceptually 
interchangeable (e.g., Maglio, Trope, & Liberman, 2013; Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & Alexopoulos, 
2012; cf. Žeželj & Jokić, 2014). Priming high- or low-level construal on one dimension can 
prime high- or low-level construal on a different dimension (e.g., Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & 
Algom, 2007; Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2011).  
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CLT and values. Values, because of their abstract and decontextualized nature (e.g., 
providing continuity and meaning under changing environmental circumstances, Feather, 1995; 
serving as stable, meaning-producing superordinate cognitive structures, Rohan, 2000; acting as 
trans-situational guides, Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) should be more readily applied to and guide 
attitudes and behavior in psychologically distant situations (Trope & Liberman, 2010). For 
instance, Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, and Chaiken (2009) had participants assess the 
importance of values (e.g., self-direction) and then rated the likelihood of performing behaviors 
congruent with these values (e.g., “examine the ideas behind rules and regulations before 
obeying them”) both in the near future and distant future. The authors found that the correlation 
between importance of the value and likelihood of performing behaviors associated with that 
value are much stronger in the distant future as opposed to the near future. In short, a growing 
body of evidence suggests that values are more likely to guide people’s judgments in distal rather 
than proximal contexts.  
Self-interest 
 A non-negligible body of literature suggests that self-interest plays a little (negligible, 
even) role in forming attitudes about social and political issues (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 1991; 
Caplan, 2007; Chong, Citrin, & Conley, 2001; Huddy, 2013; Sears & Funk, 1990). Indeed, 
Miller and Ratner (1998) consistently found across five studies that people often overestimate 
the extent to which self-interest plays a role in attitudes and behavior, when in reality, there 
seems to be little evidence that it does, in fact, play a large role. Haidt (2012) even went as far as 
to argue that not only is self-interest not a major factor in political attitudes, but rather political 
attitudes are often self-sacrificing.  
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 The lack of effects of self-interest on attitudes and behavior is certainly not a unanimous 
consensus among scholars, however. Weeden and Kurzban (2017) claim self-interest is, in fact, a 
major determinant of attitudes. Among other arguments, these authors claim that one problem 
with self-interest as it often appears in the literature is that it is often a very narrowly defined. 
For instance, studies often only include immediate, short-term interests, and exclude long-term 
interests, social status, and group interest as being related to “self-interest” (e.g., Kinder, 1998; 
Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Sears & Funk, 1990; Sears et al., 1980). Weeden and Kurzban (2017) 
held that there is sufficient overlap between the self-interest of individuals within a group and the 
groups’ interests (which have been found to be important in attitudes; e.g., Haidt, 2012; Huddy, 
2013; Kinder, 1998) such that these two constructs should not be treated as fundamentally 
different constructs. Rather “group-interest” is simply “self-interest based on group memberships” 
(Weeden & Kurzban, 2017, cf. Huddy, 2013). In short, Weeden and Kurzban (2017), claim that 
as a practical matter, what has typically been defined as “self-interest” and “group-interest” 
collapse onto one construct that could reasonably be called “self-interest.” 
 Nonetheless, even among the scholars who minimize the role of self-interest, it is known 
there are many “exceptions.” The symbolic attitude perspective holds that self-interest may be a 
major determinant of attitudes when the consequences to material self-interest are very clear, 
large, or imminent, and offer unambiguous benefits or impose tangible costs (e.g., Huddy, 2013; 
Kinder, 1998; Sears & Funk, 1991; Taber, 2003). For instance, whether it is homeowners 
supporting property tax cuts more than non-homeowners (Sears & Citrin, 1985); smokers 
opposing tobacco tax increases more than non-smokers (Green & Gerken, 1989); individuals 
who are most concerned about medical expenses being least likely to oppose universal healthcare 
coverage (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011); how individuals economic status predict preferences on 
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welfare spending and economic policies (Margalit, 2013; Owens & Pedulla, 2014); or public 
employees opposing tax cuts (i.e., where their income comes from; Sears & Funk, 1990), there is 
no shortage of evidence that self-interest does play some role in attitudes. Weeden and Kurzban 
(2017) go so far as to claim that perhaps the exceptions outnumber the non-exceptions.  
 In short, the evidence of self-interest having an impact of attitudes and behaviors is 
mixed, at best. Perhaps the operationalizations have obfuscated the real effect; perhaps there is 
no real effect; or perhaps the real effect is just context specific and the context sometimes goes 
unnoticed (or unspoken) among researchers. In any case, this question warrants further 
exploration to clarify relationships and boundaries between these constructs. 
Replicated study 
Hunt and colleagues (2010) sought evidence that values and financial self-interest each 
affect social and political attitudes, but in different temporal contexts (i.e., the near future vs. 
distant future). By conceptually replicating the paradigm used by these authors, I sought to 
expand their findings and broaden the understanding of and links between CLT, values, and self-
interest (see Table 1 for changes between Hunt et al. and the present study). Hunt et al. had 
participants endorse the extent to which they support a 10% tuition increase in order to fund 
minority scholarships in light of state-budget cutbacks; half were told the increase would take 
place in “a few weeks” and half were told the increase would take place “next year.” In doing so, 
greater agreement indicated greater willingness to put the interest of others above one’s own 
(financial) self-interest. Because the tuition increase was for minority scholarships, it was argued 
that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is a 
“value” that would be related to support of the tuition increase, such that individuals high in 
SDO would be less likely to support the increase that those who are low in SDO. “Objective” 
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material self-interest was operationalized by financial strain, measured by assessing the number 
of financial assistance sources participants have (e.g., parental income, financial aid, 
scholarships) as well as whether they worked full time or part time, or have no work-based 
income.  
Hunt et al. (2010) hypothesized that financial strain (e.g., working full time while having 
limited additional sources of income) and SDO would each be negatively related to willingness 
to pay more tuition, but which of these two predictors would be strongest would depend on the 
temporal framing. Specifically, because values (e.g., SDO) are abstract concepts that guide 
people’s thoughts and behaviors (Schwartz, 2012), values are a “high-level” construal and should 
be a stronger predictor in the “high-level” temporal construal of the distant future. By contrast, 
the immediate concreteness of one’s own financial strain, a “low-level” construal, would be a 
stronger predictor in the “low-level” temporal construal of the near future.  
These authors found their hypothesized relationship (n = 71). Specifically, a model that 
considered only the main effects of temporal construal, self-interest (i.e., financial strain), and 
SDO (i.e., values) found only a significant effect for SDO (b = -.48, se = .20, p < .05). By 
contrast, after adding the construal × financial strain and construal × SDO interactions to the 
model, financial strain became a significant main effect (b = -.49, se = .21, p < .05), and each 
interaction was significant (construal × strain: b = .64, se = .26, p < .05; construal × SDO: b = -
1.06, se = .37, p < .01). The authors interpreted these results as demonstrating that in the near 
future, people were less likely to support a tuition increase (at their own expense) to benefit 
someone else (i.e., more driven by self-interest than values). However, in the distant future 
condition, financial strain (positively) and SDO (negatively) predicted increased support for the 




In the present study participants were primed with either self- or other-focused values to 
increase the accessibility of said values (see Method). Then participants read a memo, ostensibly 
from the Director of Student Support Services at a university, about a $150 per semester student 
fee increase, which would be used to fund additional scholarships for incoming freshman. Half 
of the participants were given a memo from the (socially proximal) University of Arkansas; half 
were given a memo from the (socially distal) University of Maine. Participants were then asked 
about their support for and attitudes towards the fee increase.  
This design has several notable departures from the paradigm used by Hunt et al. (2010). 
First, rather than only measure values as Hunt et al. did, the present study manipulated the 
accessibility of self-focused vs. other-focused values. I used this same manipulation as Gerbasi 
and Prentice (2013) only substituting items from Schwartz’s Personal Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2009) for the SVS items (see Method). In doing so, participants in the 
other-focused condition should be more likely to be influenced to exhibit other-focused attitudes 
or behaviors, and participants in the self-focused condition should be more likely to exhibit self-
focused attitudes or behavior. Additionally, for a second values operationalization more in line 
with Hunt et al. (2010), a study pre-screen used a modified 19-item Schwartz Short Values 
Survey (SSVS; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2010; see Method) to capture measured values (see 
below). 
Furthermore, to generalize the findings across dimensions of psychological distance 
(which should be conceptually interchangeable, e.g., Maglio, Trope, & Liberman, 2013), rather 
than manipulate temporal distance as did Hunt et al. (2010), I chose to instead manipulate social 
distance as described above. Also, to circumvent the need to exclude non-white participants (as 
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did Hunt et al.) and avoid potential race-attitude influence (e.g., racial prejudice influencing 
attitudes), I made the purpose of ostensible fee increase funding for scholarships for “incoming 
freshman” rather than minorities (as Hunt et al.). Finally, to test for boundary conditions of 
financial self-interest, I included two subjective socio-economic status/financial strain measures 
in addition to the objective financial strain measure used by Hunt et al.  
I predicted main effects of each of these three variables, such that, 1) decreased self-
interest (i.e., financial strain), 2) having other-focused values be made more readily accessible, 
and 3) considering a scenario that has a (socially) distal construal, would each increase support 
for the fee increase. However, I also predicted several interactions. Because abstract values have 
been found to be better predictors of behavior than concrete attitudes in distal (as opposed to 
proximal) scenarios (e.g., in the distant future, rather than near future), I predicted that values 
accessibility would have a greater impact in the socially distal University of Maine condition, 
whereas self-interest would have greater impact in the socially close University of Arkansas 
condition. Additionally, I predicted that self-focused (other-focused) value accessibility would 
exacerbate (attenuate) the effect of self-interest. I did not hold any specific a priori predictions 
about whether these differences in two-way interactions would be great enough to show a 
significant a three-way interaction.  
A second set of analyses operationalized values as a measured, rather than manipulated, 
variable. I substituted a values measure from a prescreen survey in place of the dichotomous 
values accessibility condition variable. A composite score of the prescreen items was computed 
that created a measure of the relative importance participants held for self-focused values over 
other-focused values. Predictions in these analyses paralleled the primary analyses predictions 
(e.g., having a disposition to place more importance on self-focused values is analogous to being 
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in the self-focused values accessibility condition). I only predicted that the strength of the 
relationship may increase due to the more nuanced measure.1  
Finally, a third analysis utilized the same conceptual models as Hunt et al. (2010), to 
provide the most direct test of replicating their findings. In this third analysis, only one of the 
self-interest measures (i.e., the same objective financial strain self-interest measure used by Hunt 
et al.) and the measured values (i.e., that which is closest to the values measure used by Hunt et 
al.) was used. This model also differed by not including the values × self-interest interaction (see 
Replicated study above for predictions)
                                               
1 For instance, not everyone in the other-focused condition would necessarily be other-focused, 
even post-manipulation; but, by capturing the general extent to which someone is self- or other-





Changes from Hunt et al. (2010) to the present study 
Change 
 
Original >> Present 
study 
  Reason 
Sample size 
 
n = 71 >> n = 335 
 




only >> none 
 
I had no need to restrict my sample to only White participants because the DV was not 







Hunt et. al used a single 7-point Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree), however 
I wanted to capture a broader measure of support for the policy.  
  
10% tuition 




A previous (unpublished) pilot study assessed undergraduate's estimates of what a 10% tuition 
increase equates to in dollars and found highly variable and inaccurate responses. Thus, I used a 
dollar amount to ensure all participants knew exactly how much they were being asked to pay. 
  
Minority 




1) To eliminate the need to remove minorities from analysis. 2) To ensure racial prejudice is not 





1) To generalize previous findings across construal dimensions. 2) In prior (unrelated, 
unpublished) studies, I have tried manipulating temporal construal, and have not been 
convinced it is effective despite its use in the literature. 
Values 
 
SDO >> SSVS 
 
SDO was not less relevant in the present study as the DV was no longer about supporting racial 
minorities. Schwartz's (2012) values theory is well established in the literature, and these are 




The addition of a values accessibility manipulation  
Self-
interest  
OFS >> OFS, SFS, 
Ladder  
SFS was added to explore if any differences exist as a function of subjective, rather than 
objective, financial strain. The ladder item was added to explore the possibility of using this as 
a single-item measure in future studies. 
Note. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al. 1994). SSVS = Schwartz Short Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 
2010). SFS = "subjective financial strain." OFS  = "objective financial strain." "Ladder" is the subjective economic status item from 







A priori power analysis 
 My planned analysis included seven parameters (all three main effects (construal, values, 
and self-interest), each two-way interaction, the three way interaction, and the intercept). Given 
these seven parameters, an effect size of f 2 = .0461 (the average effect size for published social-
psychological studies; Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003)2, 80% power, and α = .05, the a 
priori sample size for analysis needed to be at least 319 participants from the University of 
Arkansas general psychology undergraduate subject pool. 
However, previous research conducted from this subject pool has consistently found 
roughly 30% of participants produce data that should not be used. For instance: meta-data has 
shown that participants did not open a link that contained the manipulation vignette (i.e., they did 
not receive the manipulation); page timing has shown participants were only on a manipulation 
vignette page for a few seconds (i.e., they did not have time to fully read the manipulation); 
multiple straight-forward attention checks have been missed (i.e., not paying attention and taking 
the study seriously); outlier answers have been so extreme they were face-valid to exclude (e.g., 
claiming they believed fair pay for doing a 1.5 minute word-search task is over $1M). As such, 
to facilitate a minimum of 319 participants in my analysis, I adjusted my a priori stopping point 
to 425 participants, with the expectation of liberally excluding participants (see exclusion criteria 
below).  
 
                                               
2 I chose to not base my expected effect size on Hunt et al. (2010) due to the design differences 
in the studies, as well as my sense that some limitations (e.g., only white participants, potentially 
racially charged responses, small sample size) could have artificially inflated the effect beyond 




Participants who completed all seven items of a subjective financial strain measure on a 
department prescreen3 (see below) were recruited to participate in an online study ostensibly 
pertaining to “memory and opinions.” Four hundred twenty five students from the University of 
Arkansas subject pool completed the study (see Table 2 for all method section descriptive 
statistics including demographics and condition cell counts). A total of 85 participants were 
removed categorically for data exclusion “red flags.” An additional 48 participants were flagged 
with “secondary” exclusion criteria (see exclusion criteria 2, below); all analyses reported for the 
present study were conducted with and without these 48 participants, but the patterns of results 
did not meaningfully differ, thus none of the “secondary sample” (i.e., excluding these 48 
participants) analyses are reported herein.  
Procedure and design 
Participants who signed up for the study were provided with a Qualtrics link to take the 
survey. Participants navigated through the survey at their own pace (completion time: M = 10.5 
min, SD = 4.1 min), and earned 1/4 credit towards their general psychology research requirement 
in exchange for participation. To ensure continuity of formatting and the visual layout of the 
study, participants were told they must complete the study on a computer, and attempts to open 
the study on a mobile device (e.g., phone, tablet) were blocked. Given that participants were able 
to access the online-study from anywhere at any time, they were also instructed to not begin the 
study unless they had at least 20 minutes to finish it, so that they would finish it all in one sitting.  
After providing informed consent in accordance with approved university IRB protocol, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions for two factors. First a values 
                                               
3 ntotal_pool = 1147; npresecreen = 873; nall_SFS_items = 823; nall_values_items = 859 
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accessibility manipulation was used to make self-focused or other-focused values more 
accessible to participants. Later, a construal manipulation manipulated whether the social 
distance (i.e., construal) of the memo (and as such, the fee increase) was proximal or distal.  
During the survey, participants first completed a values accessibility manipulation task. 
Participants then read (one of two versions of) a memo from a university about an upcoming 
student fee increase in order to fund scholarships for incoming freshman. After answering a few 
questions to make sure participants understood the message of the memo they read, participants 
indicated their support for the fee increase, answered items about their self-interest (i.e., two 
additional socio-economic status operationalizations), and provided other demographic 
information. Finally participants were debriefed, thanked, and redirected back to the subject pool 
credit management platform, where they received credit for participating. Full materials (with 
temporal ordering) for this study are available in the Appendix. 
Materials. This study included three primary independent variables. Construal and 
values accessibility were both manipulated, categorical IVs. Three different operationalizations 
of self-interest (i.e., economic strain/status) were measured as quasi-IVs. In addition to values 
accessibility, values were also measured as an additional operationalization (see below) that is 
more in line with the values operationalization of Hunt et al. (2010) for secondary analyses. 
Values accessibility manipulation. At the beginning of the study, similar to Gerbasi and 
Prentice (2013), participants were randomly assigned to complete a task intended to manipulate 
the accessibility of either self-focused values or other-focused values. Participants read 18 items 
from Schwartz’s Personal Values Questionnaire (Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012), which told 
participants about a person, and asked the extent to which that person is like himself or herself on 
a 6-point Likert-type scale (not at all like me; not like me; a little like me; somewhat like me; like 
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me; very much like me). Participants in the other-focused values condition were shown only 
other-focused, “social” values (e.g., conformity: “It is important to them to be polite to other 
people all the time. They try to never to disturb or irritate others.”). Participants in the self-
focused values condition were shown only self-focused, “individual” values (e.g., achievement: 
“Being very successful is important to them. They like to impress other people.”). To try and 
facilitate participants engaging with the materials and reading the values closely, they were told 
their memory of the items they read will be tested later on, so they needed to pay close attention 
and read the items carefully. All 18 items were presented in random order. 
Construal manipulation. To manipulate the construal level of the DV, participants read a 
memo ostensibly from the Director of Student Support Services of a university about an increase 
in student fees to fund future scholarships at the university (see Appendix for example). 
Participants were randomly assigned to read either a memo from the University of Arkansas 
(socially proximal), or the University of Maine (socially distal). These two memos were identical 
with the exception of the official university letterhead shown on each version. Participants were 
told: 
Many universities ask departments that collect data from students to help 
gather student input on a number of issues important to students and the 
university. For part of today’s study, we would like to show your a memo from 
the University of [Arkansas/Maine] about some changes that will be implemented 
next year. We will then ask you some questions about what you read. Your 
responses will remain anonymous, so please carefully read the following pages 
and give your honest feedback.  
 
After reading these instructions, participants were directed to a PDF memo, which 
explained that due to tax cuts, the university will no longer have the money to offer the number 
of scholarships that it has historically offered. As a result, the university will be implementing a 
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new $150 per semester student fee, beginning the “next semester” (Spring 2019), to continue 
offering scholarships to incoming freshman the following year (Fall 2019).  
Self-interest (financial strain). Because the DV asked participants how they felt about 
having to pay extra money to benefit someone else, it is against one’s financial self-interest to 
support it. Furthermore, the more financial strain one is experiencing, the more supporting such a 
fee increase goes against their self-interest. Thus, self-interest was operationalized with three 
variables: financial strain (subjective and objective) and a one-item self-report socio-economic 
status (SES) variable.4 
Subjective financial strain. Though Hunt et al. (2010) only measured objective financial 
strain, I chose to assess if the pattern of relationships holds for subjective financial strain as well, 
or if this might be a boundary condition for the effect of self-interest. Subjective financial strain 
(SFS) was measured on the department prescreen5 using seven items adapted from Conger et al. 
(2002). Four items asked participants the extent to which they feel they are able to afford 
adequate housing, clothing, food, and medical care on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored with 1 
(strongly agree) and 5 (strongly disagree). Participants then used 5-point Likert-type scales to 
indicate the extent to which they feel they feel they have had difficulty paying bills in the last 12 
months (no difficulty at all; a great deal of difficulty), how much money they feel they have left 
over at the end of each month (more than enough money left over; not enough to make ends 
meet), and how they feel about their financial situation compared to other people their age (far 
                                               
4 Bivariate correlations between these three variables ranged from .29 to .32; ps < .001. 
5 SFS was measured prior to the study to avoid order effects of asking participants about 
subjective feelings of financial strain after reading a memo about the university asking them for 
more money, or thinking about their subjective financial strain before reading the memo. 
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better off financially; far worse off financially). Cronbach's alpha was sufficient (α = .86) to 
compute the mean across these seven items as the measure of participants’ SFS.  
Objective financial strain. Objective financial strain (OFS) was measured after the DV 
items and manipulation checks with eight items modeled after Hunt and colleagues’ (2010) 
financial strain measure. This scale is used to estimate how many sources of financial assistance 
participants benefit from (e.g., parental income, scholarships, student loans, other government 
assistance) on 3-point scales (not at all, a little bit, and a lot) as well as how much they work (not 
at all, part time, full time). With each sale scored 0 to 2, the sum of all eight items (range: 0 – 16) 
serves the participants’ measure of OFS where higher numbers indicating greater financial strain. 
Alternative SES (“the ladder”). An additional one-item measure of SES, first published 
by Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, and Ickovics (2000), was also included in the study. This measure 
was included to explore its relationships with subjective and objective financial strain and assess 
the feasibility of using this simple, single-item measure in lieu of subjective and/or objective 
financial strain in future research. On this measure, participants were given a drawing of a ladder 
with 10 rungs numbered 1 to 10 (bottom to top) and had the instructions: 
Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in your country. At the top of the 
ladder (10) are the people who are the best off (those who have the most money, most education, 
and best jobs). At the bottom (1) are the people who are the worst off (those who have me least 
money, least education, and worst jobs or no job). The higher up you are on this ladder, the 
closer you are to the people at the very top; the lower you are, the closer you are to the people at 
the very bottom. Where would you place yourself on this ladder? 




Dependent variable. The dependent variable of the study was conceptually the extent to 
which participants are willing to forego their own financial self-interest for the sake of some 
generalized “other.” This was operationalized as a series a questions with 7-point Likert-type 
scales that are designed to capture general beliefs about and attitudes towards this proposed new 
student fee. Participants indicated the extent to which they support and agree with the increase 
(Strongly [oppose/disagree] to Strongly [support/agree], and reported their attitudes towards the 
proposed increase on three semantic differential scales (harmful – beneficial; wise – foolish; bad 
– good). The order of these five scales was randomized and one of the three semantic scales was 
worded to be reverse scored. After reverse scoring the appropriate item, Cronbach's alpha was 
assessed and sufficient (α = .92) for creating a mean composite score of “support for the fee 
increase” (i.e., the DV). 
Manipulation and attention check(s), exclusion criteria. 
Values accessibility manipulation check. I operationalized the construct of “values 
accessibility” as the extent to which one endorses engaging in self- vs. other-oriented thinking. 
Specifically, participants responded on a 7-point Likert type scales anchored with (1 = “only 
think about others” and 7 = “only think about myself,” to statements about the extent to which 
they think about themselves vs. others (1) “In their day-to-day life” (i.e., “typically”), and (2) 
“while reading the memo specifically.” These variables allowed for assessing whether 
participants were differentially thinking about the “other,” depending on which values were 
made more accessible by the manipulation, controlling for the amount they “typically” think 
about themselves vs. others.  
Construal manipulation check. To try and tap into how psychologically close or distant 
the DV felt to participants (i.e., the construal level of the memo), I attempted to succinctly 
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explain the idea of psychological distance to participants, and then ask them about the distance 
they felt when reading the memo. Furthermore, I asked participants the distance they felt from a 
reference point that would be common across conditions in an attempt to control for individual 
differences in psychological distance perception. Participants read: 
Some things feel "mentally closer" (“hitting close to home” or “in the 
feels,” as some would say), while others feel more "mentally distant" (less "up 
close and personal"). For instance, finding out a close friend or relative was in a 
car accident generally "hits closer to home" ("feels closer") than finding out a 
random student in one of your classes was in a car accident (which feels more 
"distant").  
Then participants were asked, “As you read about the upcoming fee increase, how close or 
distant did it feel to you personally?” on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored with “Very close” 
and “Very distant.” To check distance perceptions across conditions with a common reference 
point, participants then used the same scale to answer how close or distant their upcoming winter 
break felt.6  
Memo checks (exclusion criteria 1). After participants read the memo, three questions 
checked to make sure participants read the memo well enough to recognize the three critical 
parts of the memo. They were asked: “What was the topic of the memo?” (increased student fees 
to fund scholarships); “How much are student fees increasing?” ($150 per semester); and “Who 
is eligible for the scholarships created by this fee?” (any incoming freshman). It was important 
that participants knew each of these pieces of information, because the study hinged on their 
                                               
6 Data collection started at the beginning of second week of the fall semester, and was completed 
at the end of the third week, thus the actual difference in how much time there was before the 
winter break was negligible.  
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understanding that they were being asked to give up money for a cause that they could not 
possibly benefit from (i.e., they cannot be “incoming freshman,” so they would be ineligible for 
the future scholarships they were being asked to pay for).  
At each question, participants were offered a link to see the memo again if needed. If they 
did not answer the question correctly, they were told their answer was incorrect, and to please re-
read the memo and try again until they selected the right answer. Qualtrics was set up to track the 
amount of time participants spent on the memo page (including subsequent views if participants 
went back to check the memo again), and whether participants got the answer right on their first 
attempt.  
First, if participants missed two or three of these memo checks, they were flagged for 
removal from analysis (n = 15). Second, if participants were on the memo page (cumulatively) 
for an extraordinarily short amount of time, they were also flagged for removal. Prior to data 
analysis, I chose a cutoff time based on a study that looked at reading speed and fluency (Jordan, 
Dixon, McGowan, Kurtev, & Paterson, 2016). In this study, the “fast” (upper 50%) reading 
group could read 325-443 words per minute (wpm). To be conservative, I added an additional 
25% buffer to the upper end of this range (554 wpm), and calculated the minimum expected time 
to read the memo at 32.5 seconds. I further cut this amount of time by half, and decided any 
participants who spent < 16.25 seconds on the memo page would be flagged for removal from 
analysis (n = 65 met this criteria). Participants who were flagged due to these two checks are not 
included in any analyses.  
Attention check (exclusion criteria 2). Embedded in the study between the DV items and 
manipulation checks was a single attention check item to gauge whether participants were 
carefully reading questions vs. looking at the answer choices and assuming they knew what 
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question was being asked without actually reading them (an “instructional manipulation check;” 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) . This item read, “If you are carefully reading all of 
these questions, ignore what these answers say, and simply select retired as the answer to this 
question,” and gave the answer options, employed full time, employed part time, unemployed and 
looking for work, unemployed and not looking for work, retired, student, disabled. Forty-eight 
participants did not correctly select “retired” on this question.7 However, removing these 48 
would bring my sample size to n = 287, and thus removing them from the primary analysis 
would leave an underpowered sample as per the a priori power analysis. Given that these 
participants did not meet any other “red flag” criteria (e.g., did not miss the memo check items, 
spent enough time on the memo), they were included in the reported analyses.  
Self-reported study effort and attention (exclusion criteria 3). At the end of the survey, 
three face-valid questions asked participants about whether they paid attention and gave 
meaningful answers. The first two read, “I paid close attention to what I was reading throughout 
this survey,” and, “I carefully thought about the answer choices, and gave accurate and 
meaningful answers.” These items were answered on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored with 
“Strongly disagree” and “Strongly agree.” Finally a true/false question similar to Meade and 
Craig (2012) was presented which read, “My data should be deleted because I did not take this 
study seriously.” Three participants selected “true” to this item, and two additional participants 
answered “1” on the previous two items, and thus these five participants were flagged for 
removal from the data prior to any analysis. 
 
                                               
7 Incorrect responses (n): student: 32; employed part time: 12; unemployed and (or not) looking 
for work: 4 
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Additional measures.  
Personal values. On the department prescreen, participants completed a modified 
Schwartz Values Short Survey (SSVS; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005, 2010). In this survey, 
participants were given each of Schwartz’s (2012) values, and a brief description (e.g., 
“Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and change (or challenge) in life”) and asked the extent to 
which this value serves as a guiding principle in his or her life on an 9 point Likert-type scale (0 
= “opposed to my principles,” 1 = “not important,” 4 = “important,” 8 = “of supreme 
importance”). The SSVS has been used in a number of fields including psychology (Lönnqvist, 
Leikas, & Verkasalo, 2018), medicine (Saher and Lindeman, 2005), sociology (Gaunt, 2006), 
economics (Rajh, Budak, Žokalj, 2016), and more; however the SSVS has only been validated as 
a 10-item measure that reflects the 10 values in Schwartz’s (1992) original model of values 
(Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2010). I modified the SSVS to reflect the 19 values defined by 
Schwartz’s (2012) refinement of his values structure, and drew the descriptions for each value 
given to participants from Schwartz et al., (2012).  
The SSVS items were divided into those which fell under “personal (self) focused” and 
“social (other) focused” values, and Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable for each (αself = .73, αother 
= .76). However, before computing the mean for these value groups, it was important to control 
for the highly variable differences of values-importance ratings to retain accuracy of values 
measurements when comparing individuals or groups (e.g., Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Sandy, 
Gosling, Schwartz, & Koelkebeck, 2016). This was accomplished by computing participants 
value priorities (i.e., tradeoffs) via individual-mean-centering each value rating. In doing so, a 
rating of 7 on “value X” by a participant who rated 6’s and 7’s for all values is seen as “not that 
much of a priority to this participant [relatively speaking],” whereas that same rating of 7 would 
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be seen as a “high priority” if the rest of their values-importance ratings were at the low end of 
the scale.  
Thus, once the values scores were individual-mean-centered, the mean was taken for the 
“personal-focused” items. A resulting positive number indicates a participant places relatively 
more importance on personally focused values than socially (other) focused values (and vice-
versa). Because the study was not limited to only participants who complete all 19 items on the 
prescreen, four participants were missing > 80% of the values items and were removed from the 
data; after removing these four, seven participants were missing one SSVS item, and one 
participant was missing three items. These numbers of missing items were small enough to be 
considered negligible, and thus the means were calculated without these items.  
Demographics. Near the end of the survey, participants indicated their demographic 
information. These questions included age, gender, and race/ethnicity. Participants also self-
reported their social, economic, and overall political ideology (separately) using 7-point Likert-
type scales anchored with “Very conservative” and “Very liberal.” 
Data analytic strategy 
For the primary analysis, I created general linear models with the three primary IVs 
predicting the DV, and included only main effects in one model, main effects and two-way 
interactions in a second, and also included the three-way interaction in a third. Models were 
assessed for each operationalization of self-interest. The secondary analyses was the same as the 
primary, only the categorical values accessibility factor was replaced the prescreen values 
measure (SSVS). Finally, in the spirit of replication, I also analyzed these data with the same 
conceptual models as Hunt et al. (2010). This analysis used nested general linear models, 
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wherein a compact model with main effects only was nested within an augmented model that 
also included the construal × values and construal × financial strain interactions.  
 
Table 2 





(n = 335)  
Secondary sample 
(n = 287) 
Age: M (SD) 19.2 (3.25) 
 
19.2 (3.43) 
Gender: n (%) 
   
   Female 256 (76.4) 
 
223 (77.7) 
   Male 78 (23.3) 
 
63 (21.9) 
   Other 1 (0.3) 
 
1 (0.3) 
Race: n (%) 
  
   Caucasian 272 (81.2) 
 
234 (69.9) 
   Hispanic 28 (8.4) 
 
23 (6.9) 
   Asian 14 (4.2) 
 
11 (3.3) 
   African-American 8 (2.4) 
 
7 (2.1) 
   Native-American 3 (< 1) 
 
3 (< 1) 
   Other 10 (3.0) 
 
9 (2.7) 
Ideology: M (SD) 
   
   Overall 4.05 (1.72) 
 
4.09 (1.72) 
   Social 3.64 (1.73) 
 
3.67 (1.75) 
   Economic 4.50 (1.62) 
 
4.57 (1.59) 
Variable descriptive statistics: M (SD) 
Pre-screen values  -0.262 (0.49) 
 
-0.235 (0.49) 
SFS 2.12 (0.94) 
 
2.15 (0.96) 
OFS 4.79 (2.01) 
 
4.84 (1.96) 
Ladder 4.61 (1.47) 
 
4.61 (1.47) 
Support for fee (DV) 3.72 (1.35) 
 
3.72 (1.36) 
Condition cell counts 
 
 Values accessibility manipulation 
Construal manipulation  Self Other 
 
Self Other 
Close (U of AR) 81 81 
 
68 70 
Distant (U of ME) 87 86 
 
78 71 
Note. Pre-screen values are individual-mean-centered to indicate each 
participants' relative preference for personally focused values to other 
focused values (negative numbers = more importance on other-focused 
values). SFS = "subjective financial strain." OFS = "objective financial 







Manipulation checks. Prior to conducting analyses, I tested my manipulation checks to 
ensure the manipulations had their intended effect. To assess the effectiveness of the construal 
manipulation (close (0): University of Arkansas; distant (1): University of Maine) I used a 
general linear model to test the difference in self-reported closeness of the student fee increase as 
a function of university condition. This model showed the difference to be significant (F(1, 333) 
= 6.22; b = 0.45, p = .01; 95%CIb [0.09, 0.90]), such that the participants in the University of 
Arkansas condition (M = 3.59, SD =1.61) felt the student fee increase was closer than those in 
the University of Maine condition (M = 4.04, SD =1.67). This effect and pattern held when 
controlling for the common reference point of perceived distance to the upcoming winter break 
(F(1, 332) = 5.99; b = 0.44, p = .01; 95%CIb [0.09, 0.80]). 
Next, to assess the effectiveness of the values accessibility manipulation (other (0): 
socially-focused values; self (1): personal-focused values), I used a general linear model to test 
the difference in the extent to which participants were thinking about themselves vs. the “other” 
while reading the memo, as a function of values condition. This model showed the difference to 
be non-significant (F(1, 333) = 0.358; p = .55; 95%CIb [-0.25, 0.47]; Self-focus: M = 3.88, SD 
=1.58; Other-focus: M = 3.77, SD =1.74). Controlling for participants’ “typical” amount of self- 
vs. other-oriented thinking found only this “typical” orientation variable to be significant; value 
condition still showed a non-significant effect (F(1, 332) = 0.219; p = .64; 95%CIb [-0.27, 0.44]). 
Though the values accessibility manipulation check results were not as expected, it is possible 
that the manipulation worked, but the (untested) manipulation check item wasn’t adequate to 
capture a subtle, yet meaningful shift in values accessibility. Thus, the primary analysis 
proceeded as planned. Secondary analyses with values operationalized as a measured variable 
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were also conducted to explore meaning in the data with an assumption that the values 
accessibility manipulation had no effect, 8 but the effect of values broadly could still be 
considered using alternative methods. 
Model assumptions and case analyses. For all models presented herein, model case 
analyses inspected studentized residuals (Bonferroni-adjusted), leverage, Cook’s D, DFBETAs, 
and univariate outliers. There were not any significantly outlying cases vis-à-vis studentized 
residuals in any model. Other diagnostic criteria had one to five participants who were 
potentially outlying, influential, or otherwise problematic across the various models. However, 
given the normality of the residuals and lack of converging evidence for any given data point 
being problematic (i.e., no cases were diagnostically problematic by multiple criteria; and where 
cases were potentially problematic, it was not particularly overwhelming or concerning manner), 
I did not remove any cases from the reported analysis.9 Additionally, for all models presented, 
assumptions of general linear models were verified to be within acceptable limits. 
Primary analyses. General linear models were used to assess the effect of construal 
(social distance), values (manipulated accessibility), and self-interest (operationalized three 
different ways) on support for the student fee increase. One model assessed main effects only, a 
second included all two-way interactions, and a third included the three-way interaction. As 
shown in Table 3, none of the interactions in the six interactive models were significant. 
Construal had a significant main effect, such that participants supported the fee increase more in 
                                               
8 To rule out the possibility that the effectiveness of the manipulation was moderated by pre-
existing values dispositions (e.g., the “other-focus” manipulation differentially effecting 
participants who already place higher importance on other- vs. self-focus and vice-versa), I also 
tested for pre-existing values × value manipulation moderation. I found no such effects, so I do 
not report them herein. 
9 These cases were filtered out on a model-by-model basis in a separate analyses, but no 
meaningful changes were found, thus I did not report them herein.  
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the socially distal condition than in the socially close condition, but this effect was no longer 
significant after accounting for any interactions. The main effect of values was non-significant in 
each of the nine models. For self-interest, the ladder measure did not have any significant effects, 
subjective financial strain only had a significant main effect when interactions were not included, 
and objective financial strain had a significant main effect in the main-effects only and two-way 
interactive model, but not in the three-way interactive model. Across all three self-interest 
operationalizations, including interactions did not significantly reduce error (ΔR2 = .01), and 




Regression table of support for fee increase for each self-interest variable and manipulated values. 
 Self-interest operationalization 
Variable OFS  SFS  Ladder 
CON 
0.38** 0.21 0.22 
 
0.36* 0.22 0.22 
 
0.36* 0.24 0.23 
[0.09, 0.66] [-0.19, 0.62] [-0.19, 0.62] 
 
[0.07, 0.64] [-0.18, 0.62] [-0.19, 0.62] 
 
[0.08, 0.65] [-0.17, 0.64] [-0.17, 0.64] 
VAL 
-0.14 -0.32 -0.33 
 
-0.15 -0.29 -0.3 
 
-0.14 -0.28 -0.28 
[-0.43, 0.14] [-0.73, 0.09] [-0.74, 0.08] 
 
[-0.43, 0.13] [-0.70, 0.12] [-0.71, 0.11] 
 
[-0.43, 0.14] [-0.70, 0.13] [-0.70, 0.13] 
SI 
-0.09* -0.14* -0.11 
 
-0.16* -0.08 -0.15 
 
-0.05 0.01 -0.01 
[-0.16, -0.02] [-0.27, -0.02] [-0.25, 0.03] 
 
[-0.31, -0.01] [-0.34, 0.18] [-0.46, 0.15] 
 










[-0.25, 0.89] [-0.24, 0.90] 
  
[-0.29, 0.85] [-0.29, 0.85] 
  










[-0.07, 0.22] [-0.19, 0.21] 
  
[-0.28, 0.33] [-0.26, 0.59] 
  










[-0.12, 0.16] [-0.26, 0.16] 
  
[-0.49, 0.12] [-0.48, 0.39] 
  






   
-0.28 




   
[-0.89, 0.33] 
   
[-0.49, 0.30] 
Constant 
3.60** 3.69** 3.69** 
 
3.62** 3.68** 3.69** 
 
3.61** 3.68** 3.68** 
[3.35, 3.85] [3.40, 3.98] [3.40, 3.98]   [3.37, 3.87] [3.39, 3.97] [3.40, 3.98]   [3.36, 3.86] [3.39, 3.97] [3.39, 3.97] 
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.04 0.04  0.02 0.03 0.03 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.01 0.01 
RSE 1.32 1.33 1.33  1.33 1.33 1.33  1.33 1.34 1.34 
F 4.46** 2.64* 2.38*  3.81* 2.31* 2.10*  2.76* 1.74 1.52 
df (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327)   (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327)   (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327) 
Note: n = 335 for all models. Reported are the slopes and 95%CI of slopes. CON = construal (coded 0 = proximal/UA, 1 = 
distal/UM). VAL = values condition (coded 0 = "other focus", 1 = "self focus". SI = self-interests (i.e., the financial strain or socio-
economic status variables). OFS/SFS = Objective/Subjective Financial Strain (mean centered). Ladder = mean centered subjective 
socioeconomic stats as per the Addler et al. (2000) measure. RSE = Residual std. error.  










Secondary analyses. The same models from the primary analysis were repeated but with 
the prescreen SSVS values measure (scored such that higher importance of self-focused values 
are positive and higher other-importance is negative) substituted for the values accessibility 
condition factor. As shown in Table 4, once again, none of the two- or three-way interactions 
were significant. Also again, the values measure did not have a significant effect across any of 
the models. In the models with objective financial strain, both construal and self-interest had 
significant main effects across all three additive and interactive models; support for the fee 
increase was higher I the socially distal construal condition, and as financial strain (self-interest) 
in creased, support for the fee increase decreased, as predicted. The same pattern of relationships 
was found for subjective financial strain as well, but only in the main-effects model; including 
interactions removed these significant effects. For the ladder measure of self-interest, oddly, the 
main effect of construal was significant in both the main-effects only and three-way interactive 
model, but was not significant in the two-way interactive model. Across all three self-interest 
operationalizations, including interactions did not significantly reduce error (ΔR2 ≤ .01), and 
across all nine models, R2 ≈ 2-4%. Figure 1 depects the interaction of construal, values, and self-














0.37* 0.34* 0.34* 
 
0.35* 0.32 0.31 
 
0.35* 0.33 0.33* 
[0.08, 0.65] [0.01, 0.67] [0.01, 0.66] 
 
[0.06, 0.63] [-0.01, 0.64] [-0.01, 0.64] 
 
[0.07, 0.64] [0.001, 0.66] [0.002, 0.66] 
VAL 
-0.1 -0.06 -0.06 
 
-0.12 -0.05 -0.07 
 
-0.13 -0.08 -0.08 
[-0.39, 0.20] [-0.45, 0.34] [-0.46, 0.34] 
 
[-0.41, 0.18] [-0.45, 0.35] [-0.47, 0.34] 
 
[-0.42, 0.17] [-0.48, 0.31] [-0.48, 0.32] 
SI 
-0.09* -0.11* -0.12* 
 
-0.15* -0.15 -0.17 
 
-0.05 0.01 0.02 
[-0.16, -0.02] [-0.22, -0.003] [-0.24, -0.01] 
 
[-0.31, -0.003] [-0.37, 0.07] [-0.40, 0.06] 
 










[-0.69, 0.50] [-0.69, 0.50] 
  
[-0.73, 0.46] [-0.72, 0.47] 
  










[-0.06, 0.22] [-0.06, 0.26] 
  
[-0.27, 0.35] [-0.25, 0.47] 
  










[-0.09, 0.22] [-0.19, 0.25] 
  
[-0.22, 0.40] [-0.45, 0.39] 
  






   
0.27 




   
[-0.36, 0.89] 
   
[-0.48, 0.35] 
Constant 
3.51** 3.51** 3.51** 
 
3.51** 3.53** 3.53** 
 
3.51** 3.52** 3.52** 
[3.29, 3.72] [3.29, 3.73] [3.29, 3.74]   [3.30, 3.73] [3.30, 3.75] [3.30, 3.75]   [3.29, 3.72] [3.29, 3.74] [3.30, 3.75] 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
0.02 0.03 0.03 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 
0.02 0.02 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
RSE 1.33 1.33 1.33 
 
1.33 1.33 1.34 
 
1.34 1.34 1.34 
F 4.26** 2.43*  2.11*  
 
3.65* 1.89 1.71 
 
2.67* 1.57 1.35 
df (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327)   (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327)   (3, 331) (6, 328) (7, 327) 
Note: n = 335 for all models. Reported are the slopes and 95%CI of slopes. CON = construal (coded 0 = proximal/UA, 1 = 
distal/UM). VAL = participants' SSVS values measure (mean-centered). SI = self-interests (i.e., the financial strain/socioeconomic 
status variables). OFS/SFS = Objective/Subjective Financial Strain (mean centered). Ladder = mean centered subjective 
socioeconomic stats as per the Addler et al. (2000) measure. RSE = Residual std. error.  











Figure 1. This figure depicts the (non-significant) three-way interaction between self-interest (objective 
financial strain), construal, and values. “Values Orientation” is computed such that positive numbers indicate 
greater importance of self-focused values and negative numbers indicate greater importance of other-focused 
values, thus +/- 1 SD indicates participants who are more self- and other-focused, respectively. Predicted 
values with 95%CIs are shown. 
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Replication analysis. In line with Hunt et al. (2010), I nested a model that included only 
the main effects of construal, values, and objective financial strain inside an augmented model 
that also included the interaction between construal and each values and financial strain. As 
shown in Table 5, the construal manipulation was a significant predictor of support for the 
student fee increase in the compact model, but not the augmented model. Participants in the 
“distal” condition supported the increase more than those in the “proximal” condition. The main 
effect of objective financial strain was significant in each the compact and augmented models, 
such that as OFS increased, support for the fee increase decreased. The values main effect and 
both interactions were non-significant. A model comparison of the present study’s model showed 





Table 5   




Hunt et al. (2010)10 





[0.09, 0.66] [-0.19, 0.62] 
 





[-0.43, 0.14] [-0.73, 0.09] 
 





[-0.16, -0.02] [-0.24, -0.03] 
 

























[3.35, 3.85] [3.40, 3.98] 
 
SE = .26 SE = .23  
R2 0.04 0.05    
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03  0.059 .214 
RSE 1.32 1.32    
F 4.46*** 3.17**  2.34 4.49** 
df (3, 331) (5, 329)  (3, 61) (5, 64) 
Note: n = 335. OFS model reports the slopes and 95%CI of slopes; Hunt et al. 
(2010) reports unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and HC3 robust standard 
errors. CON = social distance (Present study model), temporal distance (Hunt et al. 
model). OFS = Objective Financial Strain (mean centered). VAL = SSVS values 
measure (Present study model); Social Dominance Orientation (Hunt et al. model).  
*p < 0.5; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
 
Discussion 
The present research sought to test the hypothesis that self-interest and values 
differentially influence attitudes depending on the context of psychological distance using a 
high-powered design. To test this hypothesis, I manipulated self- vs. other-oriented values 
accessibility and construal level (social distance), measured self-interest (a few ways) and the 
                                               
10 The Hunt et al. (2010) column reprinted with permission from “Revisiting the self-interest 
versus values debate: The role of temporal perspective,” by C. V. Hunt, A. Kim, E. Borgida, and 
S. Chaiken, 2010, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(6), 1155-1158. Copyright 




importance of self- vs. other-oriented values, and I assessed the extent to which participants were 
supportive of foregoing their personal financial self-interest to an end of helping some 
generalized “other.” In short, these results indicate that values had no significant effect on 
attitudes towards the fee increase; construal and self-interest only had significant effects 
consistently when self-interest was operationalized as objective, but not subjective financial 
strain/socio-economic status; none of these variables seem to interact with one another; and the 
results of Hunt et al. (2010) failed to replicate. Below I discuss each of these variables in greater 
depth.  
Construal 
Construal had the most consistent (main) effect in this study, but not the predicted 
interaction. Participants were more supportive of the policy change when it was psychologically 
distal as opposed to when it was proximal. Some may argue that the construal manipulation did 
not actually manipulate social distance, but rather e.g., personal relevance. However, I hold that 
even in such case, personal relevance is a component of social distance if social distance is 
defined as social familiarity (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2011). Something that is very 
relevant to the self is something that is intimately close; it is inherently closer than something 
that is irrelevant to the self. One could just as easily claim that participants in the socially distal 
condition were essentially thinking of the policy increase as being hypothetical because it is not 
something that will directly effect them, while those in the socially close condition are under the 
impression that the increase is real. However, accessing psychological distance is automatic, 
even when it is not related to a specific current goal (Bar-Anan et al., 2007), and it is common 
across the different domains of construal (Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & Alexopoulos, 2012), such that 
it should make no difference if participants were construing it as socially distant, personally 
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irrelevant, or hypothetical; the expected effect of each would be one and the same (e.g, Stephan, 
Liberman, & Trope, 2011).  
Furthermore, though I am limited with the inferences I can draw given my data, along the 
lines of the aforementioned “personal relevance” argument, one potential interpretation of this 
data is as additional evidence of self-interest influencing attitudes. Because participants in the 
socially close condition were under the impression they were being asked to give up money for 
someone else, but those in the socially distal condition were reading about some group of “others” 
being asked to give up their money for another group of “others,”  it could be argued that the 
socially distant condition had no applicable self-interest in the scenario. Construed this way, the 
effect of the distal group (i.e., no self-interest) supporting the fee increase more than the 
proximal group is consistent with the effect of self-interest that I found when self-interest was 
operationalized as financial strain.   
Future directions. Future research could address this directly with a slight shift in the 
paradigm. For instance, future studies could lead participants to believe an ostensible fee 
increase is real (proximal construal), or tell them it is hypothetical (distal construal) while 
holding social distance constant. However, this would not rule out the construal – self-interest 
overlap. A different condition for the proximal social distance could rule out this problem tough; 
instead of using the University of Arkansas (the university where the study is being conducted), 
social distance could be manipulated by using Northwest Arkansas Community College 
(NWACC; based in the same county as UA) or University of Arkansas, Fort Smith (UAFS; 
approximately 55 miles from UA) vs. University of Maine. In doing so, neither 
university/college would be directly relevant to the participant (thus ruling out actual self-interest 
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as a confound), but surely NWACC or UAFS would be construed psychologically closer than 
University of Maine (whether socially or spatially).   
Self-interest 
Though many contemporary scholars have argued that self-interest plays little role in 
attitudes and behavior (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 1991), these data seem to indicate support for the 
opposite. Especially when considering the models of objective financial strain, there is a 
consistent pattern of decreasing support for the fee increase as financial strain (self-interest) 
increases. Though the interactions are not significant, Figure 1 depicts an interesting trend in the 
data. Here, if anything, the only circumstances that do not seem to predict a decrease in support 
for the new fee as self-interest increases is specifically among the participants whose values 
measures indicate they are more other-focused and are in the socially distal condition. Said 
another way, values did not matter when the attitude object was socially proximal (only self-
interest), but self-interest did not matter when it was socially distal (among those who place 
higher importance on other-focused values; i.e., attitudes were consistent with the more 
important value domain). However, it is worth explicitly reiterating that while this trend is 
interesting, this effect was non-significant, and rather modest.  
Perceived self-interest: a potential missed opportunity for understanding. It is also 
worth noting the present research could have benefited from assessing participants perceived 
self-interest (“vested interest” as some scholars would call it; e.g., Petrow & Vercellotti, 2011). 
For instance, Sivacek and Crano (1982) found that when faced with a university-wide 
requirement for comprehensive final exams, participants’ behavior was consistent with their 
attitudes to the extent that they felt strongly (whether positively or negatively) they would 
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personally be affected by the change; however, the behavior–attitude relationship was less 
consistent for participants who did not have strong feelings about the impact of the policy change.  
In the present study, there could have been participants who under- or overestimated the 
impact of a $150 per semester increase. If a participant was objectively financially strained but 
unaware of just how strained they were (i.e., underestimated their financial strain), self-interest 
as operationalized in the present study could have reasonably been expected to under-predict 
support for the fee increase. Conversely, if someone was relatively well off financially 
(objectively speaking), yet overestimated the impact of the fee increase, self-interest could have 
reasonably been expected to over-predict support for the fee increase. For example, perceived 
self-interest could have been captured with items directly tapping into the extent to which 
participants believed the fee increase would impact their financial situation, their life, etc. Indeed, 
this missing variable could have helped explain the inconsistent effects of objective and 
subjective financial strain measures (e.g., there could have been more have been more consistent 
effects between objective financial strain and objective self interest, and between subjective 
financial strain and subjective self-interest). Future research should consider, if for no other 
reason than to rule out, differences between the researcher’s operational definition of self-interest 
and the participants’ perceptions of their own vested interest in the outcome.  
Given my data, one key take-away is that the role of self-interest in attitudes may be 
nuanced and complicated, and it seems short-sighted to claim, for instance, that self-interest “is 
surprisingly unimportant” (Kinder, 1998, p. 801). It is worth noting, however, that often times in 
the self-interest literature, a specifically political context is used; it is possible that stepping 
outside a strictly political context could inadvertently alter expected effects (e.g., removing the 
influence of other variables that effect political cognition such as partisanship).  
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Clearing the quagmire. Given the conflicting findings vis-à-vis self-interest over the 
years (e.g., Chong, Citrin, & Conley, 2001; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), perhaps the solution is a 
call for researchers to cease the debate on the effects of symbolic attitudes vs. self-interest, and 
instead shift towards a unified approach to considering the effect of symbolic attitudes and self-
interest on attitudes. What empirical and/or theoretical advantages does it have to hold a rule that 
A matters and B doesn’t, if that rule is followed by a caveat, “except under the following (long) 
list of conditions, in which B matters at least as much, if not more, than A”? Though some 
scholars have been making the case that the symbolic attitudes and self-interest schools of 
thought can coexist (Crano, 1995), little progress has been made towards integrating the two in a 
cohesive manner. 
No doubt, the field of psychology (and perhaps others such as economics, politics, etc.) 
would benefit from a motivated scholar taking on the arduous task of a comprehensive survey of 
the available self-interest literature via meta-analysis. Given the breadth of self-interest research, 
the wide variety of definitions used, and the growing list of conditional exceptions to either case 
(to name but a few primary complicating factors), it would certainly be a complex endeavor. 
However, such a project could potentially lead to a more cohesive and accepted definition of 
self-interest; a disentangling of the extent (if any) to which there are meaningful “sub-categories” 
of self-interest (e.g., self- vs. group-interest, financial vs. social self-interest, short-term vs. long-
term self-interest), and differential effects of these sub-categories across different types of 
attitudes and behaviors; and a better understanding of the other conditions that may play a role in 






The lack of effects for values is this study is quite surprising. Cumulatively over the last 
couple decades alone, studies from dozens of countries with tens of thousands of participants 
have rather consistently found robust effects of values on attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Schwartz, 
2017). The values accessibility manipulation may or may not have worked, but given the 
inclusion of an established values measure, even if one holds the opinion that my values 
accessibility manipulation was wholly ineffective (discussed below), surely there would still be 
an expected effect of this measure. However, no matter how I analyzed the data (including 
testing moderation effects of pre-existing values with the manipulation), there were no effects to 
be found.  
Manipulation vs. manipulation check problems. As stated above, the manipulation 
check for the values accessibility manipulation showed non-significant differences between the 
self- and other-focused conditions. The argument was that by having participants read either 18 
statements pertaining to self- or other-focused values, these respective sets of values should be 
more accessible, and thus more influential on participants (e.g., being in the other-focused 
condition would decrease the effect of self-interest). The lack of significance for the 
manipulation check could be either due to a failed manipulation or a faulty manipulation check 
item. Given the data available, I cannot say with any confidence which of these two possibilities 
is more likely. However, it is worth foreshadowing the forthcoming discussion with a note that 
there is precedence in the literature for using this type of values accessibility manipulation (e.g., 
Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013; Katz & Hass, 1988).  
On a failed manipulation. Accepting the premise that the manipulation itself failed raises 
the question, “why?” It could be that participants failed to really engage with the materials and 
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effortfully process each statement. According to the dual-process elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), cognitive processing may take a central route that leads to 
enduring attitude change, or a peripheral route which leads to temporary shifts in attitude at best, 
or no attitude change at worst. Though the purpose of the manipulation was not persuasion, a 
dual-process model of cognitive processing could still apply. Which route is taken depends on 
the nature of what is being processed (e.g., initial attitudes), but also the motivation and ability to 
process the information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
If participants are unmotivated or unable to process the statements in the manipulation, 
these statements could take a peripheral route, and may be less influential. Because this study 
was done online and not in the lab, there is no way to control (or even know) what sort of 
environmental distractions participants may have been facing while completing the study. If 
participants were distracted, it is possible they were unable to process the information. However, 
recent evidence from a large-scale replication attempt involving 125 samples and 15,305 total 
participants from 36 countries and territories found that the effect of online vs. lab-based studies 
was non-significant on the heterogeneity of effect sizes (Klein et al., 2018), so I do not believe 
this to be the case. Nonetheless, if one is willing and able to sacrifice expediency of data 
collection for tighter environmental control, this limitation is simple to address with a lab-based 
study instead.  
As for motivation, I attempted to motivate participants to carefully read the items by 
telling them their memory of the items would be later tested. However, these instructions could 
have also inadvertently influenced the way participants process the information. The self-
reference effect is a robust effect that refers to a tendency to better commit to memory 
information that has been linked to the self (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 
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1997). Despite the instructions telling participants to respond as to whether the person described 
in the manipulation statements is like themselves (i.e., making the self-reference salient), it is 
possible that the prior instructions to read carefully because memory would be tested shifted 
participants’ attention away from this self-referent processing, and instead towards considering 
the statements as a series of discrete bits of information that needed to be memorized. In short, 
these instructions may have prompted participants to process the statements more semantically 
rather than autobiographically, and in doing so, these instructions could have reduced the extent 
to which participants centrally process the information, and in turn, reduced the effectiveness of 
the manipulation.  
Furthermore, responding to 18 Likert-type items could be too simple of a task (i.e., it is 
very easy for participants to mindlessly click through without really engaging with the materials). 
Perhaps the manipulation would have been stronger if participants had more engagement with 
the values statements. Instead of merely responding to Likert-type scales, participants could have 
given open-ended responses of some sort, which would require greater cognitive engagement. 
However, one must be careful with prompting open-ended responses as participants could 
inadvertently manipulate their own construal depending on the abstractness or concreteness of 
the responses they give. For instance, thinking about the concrete/procedural “how” of some 
concept vs. thinking about the abstract “why” of it is a commonly used construal manipulation 
(e.g., Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). Absent specific instructions on how to respond to open-
ended questions, participants could have given abstract answers that lead them to high-level 
construal processing, or concrete answers that lead them to low-level construal processing. 
Perhaps one approach would be to ask the participants to give both a high- and low-construal 
answer, and counterbalance the order across all the statements (e.g., “describe why the following 
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statement is a good thing;” “using a specific example, describe how you have recently embodied 
the following statement”).  
On a failed manipulation check. Of course, the other possibility is that the manipulation 
worked as intended, but the manipulation check was unable to capture the shift in values 
accessibility. For instance, socially-desirably responding could have influenced participants’ 
responses and led to misreporting of the extent to which they were actually thinking about 
themselves vs. the other during the study. Alternatively, by the time participants responded to 
this manipulation check item, they were several minutes past the manipulation itself (they had 
read the memo and answered all the DV items between the manipulation and the check); as such, 
it is possible that even if there were short-term changes in value accessibility, this check item 
could have been unable to capture it.  
Measured values. Ultimately, whether the manipulation or the manipulation check that 
failed is somewhat of a moot distinction though. As shown in the results, neither manipulated nor 
measured values had any significant effects (main effects nor interactions). In fact, between the 
two sets of analyses considering manipulated and measured values, very few parameter estimates 
changed (significance) across any of the models. Everything that was significant in the 
manipulated values analyses was also significant in the measured values analyses, and the 
measured values analyses only had 4 additional significant parameter estimates beyond the 
manipulated values analyses (main effect of construal in the ladder three-way interactive model, 
main effects of self-interest and construal in the OFS three-way interactive model, and the main 
effect of construal in the OFS two-way interactive model).   
Again, the present data are not conclusive, but the findings do raise questions about 
values – attitudes relationships. Along a similar vein, social psychologists have long known there 
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are sometimes inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviors (e.g., LaPiere, 1934) and have 
been investigating why this is the case. The theory of planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1985) for 
instance holds that the specificity of an attitude may affect the strength of the relationship 
between that attitude and some behavior (e.g., Davidson & Jaccard, 1979). I considered my data 
through the lens of this related idea, and thought perhaps the way I operationalized values in the 
present study was too broad to show strong relationships with my specific dependent variable. 
For instance, considering two self-focused values, “Hedonism” (pleasure, sensuous gratification, 
enjoyment in life) and “Power – Resources: (power through control of material and social 
resources) or two other-focused values, “Conformity—Rules” (compliance with rules, laws, and 
formal obligations) and “Benevolence – Caring” (devotion to the welfare of in-group member), 
surely it seems intuitive that in each case, the former examples of values (hedonism, conformity) 
are less directly related (specific) to being willing to pay money to help someone out than the 
latter two examples (power – resources, benevolence – caring). However, beyond the fully 
reported results herein, I conduced more fine-grained exploratory analyses considering each of 
the four higher-order values (conservation, openness to change, self-transcendence, and self-
enhancement), and even models looking at measures of each of the individual 19 values and 
found no significant effects or interactions for values.11 Indeed, it seems that in this context, with 
this sample, and with values measured with SVSS, values had no measurable impact on 
individuals attitudes towards the fee increase. 
 
 
                                               
11 Of these 23 additional models, only three models found p < .1, and none found p < .05 for 
either the main effect or interaction with the value variables, even without any alpha adjustment 
to control for family-wise error as would be statistically appropriate.  
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Hunt et al. (2010) replication attempt 
Finally, though there is no simple and accepted decision rule for whether a replication is 
successful (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), it certainly seems the 
present data failed to replicate the effects of Hunt et al. (2010). Whereas Hunt et al. only found 
self-interest to be a significant predictor in the proximal (but not distal) conditions, I found self-
interest to be the consistent predictor across both conditions. Where Hunt et. al found values to 
be a significant predictor, but only in the distal condition, I found no effects for values regardless 
of condition. It is worth noting, however, that many of the patterns are directionally the same 
between the present study and Hunt et al., just not the significance or magnitude. This could be a 
function of the (lack of) power in the Hunt et al. study given a sample size of 71 White college-
aged participants, which is broken down by one dichotomous factor and two continuous 
predictors.  
Conclusion 
Perhaps with some modifications (e.g., done in the lab; construal manipulation shifted to 
a nearby, but different university/college; more engaging values manipulation; additional 
measures) the paradigm used in the present study can be be improved and future research can 
find these theoretically predicted relationships between self-interest, construal, and values. This 
interaction has many important implications in social psychology (e.g., voter behavior, political 
attitudes); if self-interest overrides values in proximally construed situations by default, we could 
reasonably expect behaviors to be biased towards self-interest given the logical necessity of 
actually engaging in a behavior (as opposed to planning to engage in some future behavior) 
being in the “here and now” which cannot be distally construed. It seems prudent then to 
investigate what internal or external forces are capable of overriding this potentially automatic 
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self-interested responding. The evidence that self-interest and values each influence attitudes and 
behaviors is abundant, but there are clearly boundary conditions to these effects. To understand 
these nuanced boundary conditions is to understand the real-world effect of self-interest and 
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Subjective financial strain 
 
Complete the following statement for each of the items below using the scale provided. 
In general, I am able to afford…. 
 Adequate housing 
 Adequate clothing 
 Adequate food 
 Adequate medical care 
1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) 
 
 During the past 12 months, how much difficulty have you had paying bills? 
1 (no difficulty at all) and 5 (a great deal of difficulty)  
 
 How much money do you have left over at the end of each month? 
1 (more than enough money left over) and 5 (not enough to make ends meet) 
 
 Compared to other people your own age, how do you feel about your financial situation?" 
1 (far better off financially) and 5 (far worse off financially) 
 
 






important     Important       
Of supreme 
importance 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Achievement: Success according to social standards 
Benevolence—Caring: Devotion to the welfare of in-group members 
Benevolence—Dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group 
Conformity—Interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people (“politeness”) 
Conformity—Rules: Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations (i.e., “follow the 
rules”) 
Face: Maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation 
Hedonism: Pleasure, sensuous gratification, enjoyment in life 
Humility: Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things (accepting what 
one has without expecting more; being self-effacing rather than boastful) 
Power—Dominance: Power through exercising control over people 
Power—Resources: Power through control of material and social resources 
Security—Societal: Safety and stability of society as a whole
Security—Personal: Safety in one’s immediate environment 
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Self-Direction—Action: Freedom to determine one’s own actions (choosing own goals, 
independence, self-reliance) 
Self-Direction—Thought: Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities (creativity, 
curiosity, interest) 
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and change (or challenge) in life 
Tradition: Maintaining and preserving cultural, family or religious traditions 
Universalism—Nature: Preservation of the natural environment 
Universalism—Societal Concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
people (e.g., social justice) 

















It is important to me...  
Self-focus Other-focus 
 to form my views independently.  
 that the weak and vulnerable in society be 
protected.  
 to develop my own opinions.  
 that every person in the world have equal 
opportunities in life.  
 to figure things out myself.  
 that everyone be treated justly, even people I don’t 
know.  
 to make my own decisions about my life.  
 to be tolerant toward all kinds of people and 
groups.  
 to plan my activities independently.  
 to listen to and understand people who are different 
from me.  
 to be free to choose what I do by myself.   to accept people even when I disagree with them.  
 always to look for different things to do.   to take care of people I am close to.  
 to take risks that make life exciting.   to be a dependable and trustworthy friend.  
 to have all sorts of new experiences.   to follow rules even when no-one is watching.  
 to have ambitions in life.   to avoid upsetting other people.  
 to be very successful.   never to annoy anyone.  
 that people recognize what I achieve.   never to make other people angry.  
 that people do what I say they should.   to be personally safe and secure.  
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 to have the power to make people do what I want.   to avoid anything dangerous.  
 to be the one who tells others what to do.   that my country is secure and stable.  
 to have the power that money can bring.   to maintain traditional values and ways of thinking.  
 to be wealthy.  
 to follow my family’s customs or the customs of a 
religion.  











1) What was the topic of the memo?  
 Increasing student fees to fund scholarships because of tax cuts.  
 Increasing parking fees to fund building a new centrally located parking garage.  
 Increasing student fees to expand services offered through the University library.  
 Increasing meal costs at the student union to facilitate bringing in more variety.  
 
2) How much are student fees increasing next year?  
 $150 per semester  
 $50 per semester  
 $100 per semester  
 $200 per semester  
  
3) Who will be eligible for the scholarships created by student fee increase?  
 Any incoming freshman  
 Any University of Arkansas students  
 Any racial/ethnic minorities  




1) To what extent do you support or oppose the student fee increase?  
 1 (strongly oppose) – 7 (strongly support) 
 
2) To what extent do you agree or disagree the student fee increase?  
 1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree) 
 
3-5) I believe the fee increase is… 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial 
Wise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Foolish 
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
 
Filler questions: 
1) What is your class standing? (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) 
2) Do you have any comments for university administrators? 
 
Attention check: 
If you are carefully reading all of these questions, ignore what these answers say, and simply 
select retired as the answer to this question.  
 Employed full time  
 Employed part time  
 Unemployed looking for work  
 Unemployed not looking for work  
 Retired  
 Student  






Construal manipulation check: 
We'd like to ask you a couple additional questions to get an overall sense of how students think 
and feel about this fee increase... 
Some things feel "mentally closer" (“hitting close to home” or “in the feels,” as some would say), 
while others feel more "mentally distant" (less "up close and personal"). 
 For instance, finding out a close friend or relative was in a car accident generally "hits closer to 
home" ("feels closer") than finding out a random student in one of your classes was in a car 
accident (which feels more "distant").  
 
1) As you read about the upcoming fee increase, how close or distant did it feel to you 
personally? 1 (very close) – 7 (very distant) 
 
2) People often have different perceptions of time... When you think about your upcoming winter 
break, how mentally close or distant does it feel to you? 1 (very close) – 7 (very distant) 
 
 
Values accessibility manipulation check: 
1) In your day-to-day life, to what extent do you typically think about yourself vs. the other 
people? 
 Only think of the others  
 Mostly think about the others  
 Somewhat think about the others more  
 Equally think of myself and the others 
 Somewhat think about myself more  
 Mostly think about myself  
 Only think about myself  
 
2) When reading and thinking about the fee increase, to what extent were you thinking about 
yourself vs. the other people? 
 Only thought of the others  
 Mostly thought about the others  
 Somewhat thought about the others more  
 Equally thought of myself and the others  
 Somewhat thought about myself more  
 Mostly thought about myself  
 Only thought about myself  
 
Objective financial strain 
We would like to have an idea about your current financial situation. 
Below is a list of financial sources typically used by students in college to pay for school as well 
as cover the cost of living expenses (e.g., housing, food, entertainment).  
 
To get by as a student, to what extent do you rely on… 
 
1) Working while in school: I do not work (0); I work part time (1); I work full time (2)  
2) Parental income* 
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3) Need-based scholarships (i.e., scholarships available to low-income students only)* 
4) Other scholarships (e.g., academic, athletic)* 
5) Student loans* 
6) Student grants* 
7) Other government programs (e.g., SNAP nutrition assistance, housing assistance)* 
8) Other sources (please specify)* 
 
* Indicates: Not at all (0); a little bit (1); a lot (2) 
 




Self-reported political ideology: 
 
When it comes to politics… 
 overall, I consider myself to be…. 1 (very liberal) – 7 (very conservative) 
 socially, I consider myself to be…. 1 (very liberal) – 7 (very conservative) 











Self-report exclusion criteria: 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 
1) I paid close attention to what I was reading throughout this survey. 
 1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
 
2) I carefully thought about the answer choices, and gave accurate and meaningful answers. 
 1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
 
3) My data should be deleted because I did not take this study seriously.  
 True or False 
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